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Abstract: 
The use of child soldiers in conflicts has received increasing academic attention in recent years. This article 
examines post-conflict periods to see whether the use of child soldiers mobilises United Nations peacekeeping 
operations (UN PKO) in the aftermath of a conflict. Taking into consideration how child soldiers affect conflict 
and how important their reintegration is to sustainable peace and post-conflict development, we analyse 
whether the presence of child soldiers in a civil war increases the likelihood of the presence of a PKO. We 
argue that the UN deems a conflict with child soldiers as a difficult case for conflict resolution, necessitating a 
response from the international community. This is in line with our empirical results confirming that the use of 
child soldiers significantly increases the likelihood of peacekeeping. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In March 2014 the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sent a report to the 
Security Council about the escalating conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR).1 The 
intention of the report was to assess whether the Secretary-General recommended the 
transitioning of the existing African-led International Support Mission into a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation. Even though the report highlighted the complexity of the ongoing 
conflict in the country, it also made specific references to the grave human rights violations 
committed against children- notably their recruitment into armed groups. The estimated increase 
in the recruitment of children into armed groups in the CAR was alarming; from 3500 to 6000 in 
a year. The Secretary-General proposed a multidimensional peacekeeping operation to be deployed 
with a mandate inclusive of: ‘... reintegration of former armed elements, with specific attention to 
children, and the repatriation of foreign elements, as well as community violence-reduction 
programmes’.2 
UNICEF defines child soldiers as any child under 18 years of age3, who takes part in any 
kind of irregular or regular armed force or armed group in any capacity.4 For example, children 
recruited to work at checkpoints, as cooks, information collectors, sex slaves and wives are 
included- a child soldier does not have to necessarily carry a weapon.5 Our theoretical 
mechanisms pertain to any child participating in armed conflict. Therefore, we use a definition 
of child soldiers in this article that captures all of the above-mentioned categories.6 
Recruiting child soldiers is against international law and punishable as a war crime in the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The UN Security Council has addressed the issue of child 
soldiers since 1999 and dealing with child soldiers has been included into the peacekeeping man- 
dates since 2001.7 In addition to this, the General Assembly introduced a Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in 1996 and has subsequently  
1United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General.  
2Ibid. 
3The threshold of 18 years has generated some controversy, but this definition of a child soldier is in accordance with 
international law and the UN convention on the Rights of the Child United Nations General Assembly. Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May 2000. 
4UNICEF. Fact sheet on child soldiers.  
5Ibid. 
6The term child combatant would refer to only those children that fight as part of a armed group, child soldier is a more 
inclusive definition. 
7United Nations Peacekeeping. Children in conflict. 
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prolonged the three year mandate.8 These steps by the UN suggest that the issue of child soldiering 
is taken seriously and that several measures are in place to prevent and punish this illegal practice. 
Despite these developments, surprisingly little academic work has been done to assess whether 
the presence of child soldiers influences the UN decisions to deploy peacekeepers to a conflict. 
The UN peacekeeping missions (UN PKOs) are often criticized for being biased in their 
deployment and inefficient in establishing and maintaining peace.9 It is indeed the case that the 
UN PKOs are not deployed at random, but recent academic research suggests that they are in 
fact deployed to the cases where the conflicts are the hardest to resolve and the likelihood of 
conflict recurrence is high.10 If the UN is indeed more motivated to resolve those conflicts that are 
notoriously hard to solve, then the assessment about the effectiveness of the PKOs in maintaining 
peace might in fact be unfairly grounded.11 We subscribe to the empirical findings of the UN 
sending peacekeepers to those cases it deems the most difficult, but we argue that the existing 
empirical literature has largely ignored another factor influencing the UN assessment of what 
constitutes a difficult case. That is, we posit that the presence of child soldiers in a conflict 
influences the classification of a conflict into a ‘hard’ case by the UN. 
We argue that the main reason for considering a conflict with child soldiers a ‘hard’ case is 
the fear of post-conflict instability. This instability stems from taught aggression and lack of 
alternative livelihoods to fighting by former child soldiers. Thus, the use of child soldiers has 
been argued to increase the likelihood of conflict recurrence,12 generating the legal pressure to 
preserve international peace and stability by the UN.13 As a consequence, we suggest that the 
UN is more likely to be present in conflicts with child soldiers.  
 
 
8United Nations.  Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.  
9Fleitz, “Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s”; Jett, “ Why Peacekeeping Fails”. 
10Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”  
11Howard, “UN peacekeeping in civil wars.”  
12Haer and Böhmelt. “Child soldiers as time bombs?  
13We refer to the legal duty of the Security Council to establish a peacekeeping mission when international peace is 
threatened, see United Nations Peacekeeping. Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping. 
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We test such argument with data on child soldiers from Haer and Böhmelt14. We find that 
the presence of UN PKOs is indeed significantly more likely in conflicts with child soldiers. 
This shows that the international community uses child soldiers as an indication about the 
difficulty of conflict resolution and invests in post-conflict stability in the ‘right places’. 
 
 
2 When Does the UN Intervene? 
 
The existing research on UN interventions has concluded that the UN PKO presence is not 
randomly allocated.15 Due to the non-random nature of peacekeeping missions, a number of 
studies have been dedicated to examining where do peacekeepers go.16 In particular, the focus 
has been on the difficulty of conflict resolution attracting a response from the UN and how the 
likelihood of conflict recurrence activates the international community.17 
Two streams in the literature discuss what makes a case hard for the UN; the one refers to 
country characteristics and the other one refers to conflict characteristics. The country specific 
attributes making conflict resolution harder are lack of state capacity, higher ethnic 
fractionalization, low economic development and lower levels of democracy18  Gilligan 
14Haer and Böhmelt, “Child soldiers as time bombs?”. 
15Gilligan, Sergenti, Callander, Urbatsch, Casella, Palfrey, and Riezman. “Do UN interventions cause peace?”.  
16Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”; Gilligan and Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”. 
17 Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, “Stabilizing the peace after civil war”. 
18Ruggeri Gizelis, and  Dorussen, “Managing Mistrust”.
Child Soldiers and UN PKO 
4
 
 
 
 
and Stedman19 suggest that UN peacekeepers tend to go to weaker states rather than strong states. 
More specifically, we see more peacekeeping operations in countries with smaller armies than 
countries with stronger military capabilities.20 Fortna21 finds that UN PKOs are more likely to take 
place in those states with a limited control over their territory and relatively strong rebel groups. 
Also, the so called identity conflicts i.e., conflicts fought over ethnic or religious identity have 
been theorised to be more likely to recur given that peaceful coexistence of such inherent 
identities can be hard in the aftermath of a conflict.22 This is because the religious and ethnic 
groups have been set against each other in the conflict.23 Nonetheless, Hartzell, Hoddie, and 
Rothchild24 do not find that identity conflicts make a difference in the intractability of peace. 
Previous research has also found that conflict recurrence is more likely when levels of economic 
development are low (thus reducing opportunity costs of rebelling),25 and availability of lootable 
natural resources is high (opportunities to finance rebellion).26 For this reason, former combatants 
are more likely to resume fighting when they lack viable economic alternatives to secure their 
livelihoods. Similarly, the availability of lootable natural resources provides the opportunities 
to fund future rebellions, making the likelihood of conflict recurrence higher in areas with 
lootable natural resource deposits. Finally, Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild27 suggest that the 
level of democracy also matters in how long the peace is likely to last. Specifically, regimes 
that have a history of inclusion are more likely to provide faith in the warring parties’ ability to 
stick to the negotiated agreements.28 Authoritarian regimes that have experienced a civil war are 
less likely to have durable peace in the post-conflict phase. 
The second strand of literature has focused on specific conflict characteristics that affect the 
difficulty of conflict resolution and the increased need for UN intervention. These conflict-related 
19Gilligan and Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?” 
20Ibid. 
21Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”  
22Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding”. 
23Ibid. 
24Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, “Stabilizing the peace after civil war”. 
25Walter, “Does conflict beget conflict?”  
26Collier and Hoeffler, “On the incidence of civil war in Africa”.  
27Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, “Stabilizing the peace after civil war”. 
28Ibid. 
Child Soldiers and UN PKO 
5
 
 
 
 
attributes are the lack of decisive military victories and peace agreements, as well as, more severe, 
longer conflicts with higher numbers of warring parties and civilian casualties.29 Fortna30  and 
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild31 find that conflicts that do not end in decisive victories and end 
without a formal peace agreement are more likely to resume. This is because without a decisive 
military victory, all parties still have the opportunity of carrying on fighting to try to topple the 
opponent. In addition, formal peace agreements normally address the main issue/s in the conflict 
and without the commitment of all parties to sign a formal peace agreement and adhere to its 
conditions, the conflict is more likely to resume.32 
The severity of a civil war has also been linked to the likelihood of conflict recurrence. First, 
the more casualties (i.e., the more costly and intense the war is), the harder it is to prevent revenge 
of the loss of the loved ones.33 The relationship, however, is less straightforward given that some- 
times high losses provide motivation to cooperate with the peacekeepers.34 This would mean that 
the conflict resolution is less challenging when parties invite the UN intervention and are willing 
to accept the terms of the peace agreement. Second, Hultman35 finds that UN peacekeepers tend 
to go to conflicts with large number of civilian casualties. This is particularly the case since 1999 
when the UN Security Council introduced a mandate specifically for the protection of civilians.36 
Some studies suggest that longer conflicts are in fact less likely to resume37 because they have 
exhausted the fighting capabilities of the warring parties and support for fighting from the general 
population. In addition, during a long fight the importance of peace and the costs of war become 
more evident to the conflict parties, and any possible miscalculations about an easy   
29Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, “Stabilizing the peace after civil war”; Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
30Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?” 
31Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, “Stabilizing the peace after civil war”. 
32Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
33Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding”. 
34This assumption is linked to the costs of war hypothesis where longer wars lead to longer peace (Hartzell, Hoddie, and 
Rothchild, “Stabilizing the peace after civil war”). 
35Hultman, “UN peace operations and protection of civilians”. 
36A number of studies also suggest that the UN interventions take place for humanitarian reasons (Brent Beardsley and 
Romeo Dallaire.  “Shake Hands with the Devil”; Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia. “Supplying peace”).  
37Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding”. 
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victory would have been adjusted.38 Finally, Doyle and Sambanis39 argue that durable peace is 
harder to achieve in conflicts with multiple actors. This is because the number of different 
preferences of the conflict outcomes increases with the number of parties involved. If several 
parties are dissatisfied with the negotiated settlement of the conflict, the war is more likely to 
resume.40 
Since all of these factors are found to make conflict resolution and durable peace more 
difficult, the question is whether the UN avoids such scenarios or in fact commits most of its 
PKO resources into such cases.41 If the UN indeed deploys to the hardest cases, then the 
criticism over its peacekeeping failures might be less warranted.42  Some studies suggest that it is 
not only the conflict conditions and escalation potential that influence the deployment of PKO, 
but also the geopolitical interests of the interveners.43 Geography44, national interests of the 
interveners45 and democratization46 have been linked to the likelihood of UN interventions. Bove 
and Elia47 find that domestic and international factors affect the calculation of a country’s troop 
supply to the UN PKOs. At the domestic level, the sustainability of multiple missions, tolerance 
for casualties and the relative value of labour affect the decision to become involved. At the 
international level, the authors find that the proximity to the conflict, number of displaced people 
and the threat to peace and stability are likely to correspond to the supply of troops. Moreover, 
humanitarian and security concerns trigger country specific responses.48 
38Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, “Stabilizing the peace after civil war”. 
39Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”. 
40Ibid. 
41Gilligan and Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”. 
42Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil wars. 
43Andersson, “Democracies and UN peacekeeping operations”; Jakobsen, “National interest, humanitarianism or CNN” 
Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping”. 
44Beardsley and Schmidt, “Following the Flag or Following the Charter?”. 
45Jakobsen, “National interest, humanitarianism or CNN”. 
46Andersson, “Democracies and UN peacekeeping operations”. 
47Bove and Elia, “Supplying peace”. 
48Ibid.
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Fortna49 finds that the UN selects the ‘hard’ cases in terms of sending PKOs to conflicts with- 
out decisive winners, formal truces and with smaller national armies. In particular, the UN PKOs 
are sent to places where conflict resolution is difficult and the likelihood of conflict recurrence is 
high. We build on the findings by Fortna50 and argue that the UN does indeed select the ‘hard’ 
cases, but they use an additional criterion in their PKO deployment process. This additional 
aspect is the use of child soldiers in the conflict, which has negative consequences for post-conflict 
stability. 
The literature on UN PKO deployment has made a significant contribution to our understanding 
about the selection processes of peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, to date none of the prior 
studies has looked at how the presence of child soldiers influences such calculus. We argue that 
the need for post-conflict stability has made the presence of child soldiers an important factor when 
assessing the difficulty of conflict resolution. More specifically, the use of child soldiers in a 
conflict creates instability in post-conflict societies. This in turn makes the conflict harder in 
terms of likelihood of recurrence and conflict resolution.51  
 
3 What Are the Consequences of Using Child Soldiers for the 
Post-conflict Society? 
Although the literature on child soldiers is less extensive than the literature on UN peacekeeping, 
a number of studies have investigated the impact of child soldiers in a conflict on post-conflict 
societies.52 Here we focus on two main aspects of the impact child soldiers have on post-conflict 
49Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
50Ibid. 
51Ibid. 
52Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, “ Child Soldiers”; Honwana. “Child soldiers: Community healing”; Schauer and Elbert. 
“The psychological impact of child soldiering”; Wessells, Child soldiers”; Haer and Böhmelt, “The impact of child 
soldiers on rebel groups”.
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instability; aggression and low opportunity costs for rebellion. These destabilising mechanisms 
in turn feed into the UN decision-making processes in order to prevent future conflicts and 
secure post-conflict stability. 
The first destabilising mechanism of child soldiers in post-conflict societies is related to 
aggression. The reasons that lead to aggression by former child soldiers in post-conflict societies 
are normalisation into violence, psychological trauma, exclusion and lack of ‘normal’ social 
skills. The socialization and normalisation argument is based on the premise that children who 
grow up surrounded by violence will accept violence as part of normal life.53 Moreover, children 
can learn the violent and aggressive behaviour from watching how others behave in a conflict 
situation and in the worst-case scenario, start emulating such behaviour.54 This is probably true 
for many children growing up in conflict zones, not just child soldiers, however, the effect is 
likely to be greater for children who are trained to fight and expected to be aggressive against 
their opponents.55 The lack of social skills by the former child soldiers has been highlighted by 
a number of scholars.56 Steenkamp57 argues that the families who would normally teach children 
traditional values and socialization, have broken down in a conflict situation. The lack of family 
involvement into the socialization of the children is even worse for child soldiers in comparison to 
children who remain with their families, albeit war affected ones. This is because child soldiers 
are physically removed from their family environment and exposed to normalization of violence 
through training. Magambo and Lett58 confirm such suggestion by finding that in northern 
Uganda former child soldiers resort to physical violence whenever trying to solve a disagreement 
because they do not have the social skills required to think of alternative methods of solving a 
conflict. Other studies also suggest that former child soldiers have problems in controlling their 
aggressive impulses,  
 
53Dickson-Gõmez,  “Growing Up in Guerrilla Camp”; Punamäki, “Childhood under conflict”. 
54Berkowitz, “Pain and aggression”. 
55Schauer and Elbert, “The psychological impact of child soldiering”. 
56Magambo and Lett, “Post-traumatic stress in former Ugandan child soldiers”. 
57Steenkamp, “The legacy of war”. 
58Magambo and Lett, “Post-traumatic stress in former Ugandan child soldiers”. 
59Schauer and Elbert, “The psychological impact of child soldiering”.
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even in a post-conflict situation.59 Such aggressive behaviour can manifest itself even when the 
former child soldiers return home and can lead to a spiral or exclusion and further aggression.60 
The receiving communities often fear aggressiveness of former child soldiers, and as a 
consequence the returning children often face social exclusion. They might be stigmatised and 
blamed for their actions due to the lack of understanding the circumstances of their abductions 
and forced violence.61 When reintegration efforts are not successful, exclusion can in turn lead 
to aggression making former child soldiers more likely to either initiate or partake in future 
conflicts. This can break the fragile peace and draw the society back into resuming violence. 
The second destabilising mechanism of child soldiers in post-conflict societies is the lack 
of economic opportunities, and the subsequently lower opportunity costs of resuming fighting. 
Instead of psychological consequences, Blattman and Annan62 suggest that the main issues the 
abductees struggle with are educational deficit due to absence from schooling and subsequent low 
earnings. Based on their survey evidence in Uganda, the authors note that though psychological 
issues can have an impact on the reintegration of child soldiers, the educational, and consequently, 
economic grievances are more important in explaining the challenges of reintegration. The 
psychological distress is only normally high for those abductees that have been subjected to war-
time violence (i.e., having a violent group leader) and in fact they find that on average abductees 
are not more aggressive than non-abductees. Former child soldiers in their study seem 
psychologically resilient and report high levels of acceptance back into their native communities.63 
Child soldiers face reintegration problems mostly because of the lack of education leads to lack of 
opportunities in finding employment. The problem of educational deficit is exasperated64, particularly 
in protracted conflicts that have a higher likelihood of child  
 
60Honwana, “Child soldiers: Community healing”. 
61Betancourt, Agnew-Blais, Gilman, Williams, and Ellis, “Past horrors, present struggles”. 
62Blattman and Annan, “The consequences of child soldiering”.  
63Ibid. 
64Annan, Blattman, Mazurana, and Carlson,“Civil war, reintegration, and gender.”  
65Lasley and Thyne, “Secession, legitimacy and the use of child soldiers”.  
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soldier recruitment.65  Children who spend several years fighting miss out on education and crucial 
vocational training, such as carpentry. Missing out on schooling and training skills lead to a 
situation where these children have no means of supporting themselves or their families.66 Such 
economic hardship, lack of education and consequently low earnings can create motivation for 
future conflicts.67 Former child soldiers without livelihoods have low opportunity costs of starting 
or joining another episode of fighting due to the lack of any other viable alternatives. This in turn 
can spiral communities back into a violent civil war. 
Haer and Böhmelt68 find that child soldiers are positively related to conflict recurrence leading 
to a conflict trap.69 They argue that child soldiers affect both the willingness and opportunity to 
engage in future armed conflicts due to both socialisation and normalisation of violence as well as 
for economic reasons. We subscribe to these two mechanisms by adding that since child soldiers 
can have a destabilising effect on the post-conflict societies, the UN has a legal duty to act. 
Moreover, the UN PKOs are intended to preserve international peace and security and the risk 
of conflict recurrence threatens such stability.  
 
4 Child Soldiers and the UN Decision-making Process 
 
How are child soldiers linked to the UN decision to deploy peacekeepers to a conflict? The UN 
makes an assessment about the difficulties post-conflict reconciliation and uses information 
about the country and the conflict to make such evaluation. Given that the presence of child 
soldiers affects post-conflict stability, the UN accounts for their presence when evaluating 
conflict conditions. Post-conflict instability can - in worst cases - lead to conflict recurrence70, 
threatening international peace and security. The UN is acutely aware of such risks as suggested  
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, Jacques Paul Klein: ‘Liberia’s 
66Wessells, Child soldiers: From violence to protection. 
67Blattman and Annan, “The consequences of child soldiering”. 
68Haer and Böhmelt, “Child soldiers as time bombs?   
69Blattman, “From violence to voting Uganda”.  
70Collier, “Bottom billion”. 
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long-term security and stability would only come with an economy that could create steady 
employment for young adult males, supported by a credible, democratic, and accountable 
government’.71 In fact, all the UN PKOs that were deployed in conflicts with child soldiers 
since 2000 have had an explicit mentioning of child soldiers in their mandates.72 
The UN makes a decision about PKO deployment through several different steps. Normally 
when a conflict either escalates or gets closer to a resolution, the UN starts planning the best 
response by the international community. At the initial planning stage the Secretary-General might 
request a technical mission to the conflict area in order to have a better assessment of the 
situation. It is often at this point where we can see evidence of how the presence of child soldiers 
influences the recommendations about a PKO deployment. In January 2000, the Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan proposed an expansion of the PKO mandate in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC). He voices his concern about the continuing recruitment of child soldiers and states 
that: ‘To ensure that the lives of children are protected, it will be necessary to act before the fragile 
Ceasefire Agreement further erodes’.73 Such assessments or reports are then submitted to the 
Security Council who makes a decision about a PKO mission, its mandate and size.74 
The primary aim of a UN PKO is to ensure that the post-conflict peace is stable and that the 
conflict does not recur. In light of such concerns, the successful reintegration of child soldiers 
is vital in achieving post-conflict stability. The reintegration issues feature in the 2007 UNICEF 
Paris Principles (Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed 
Groups).75 Additionally, the document suggests that stakeholders (such as UN organisations) 
need to: ‘Raise awareness of the problems that may occur when children return, such as 
aggressive and rebellious behaviour and drug or alcohol use’.76   Likewise, The Paris Principles 
note that former child soldiers need to be 
 
 
71United Nations Security Council. Chairman of transitional government.  
72Our sample has altogether 14 UN PKOs. Child soldiers were present in 12 of those conflicts and the UN mentioned the 
issue of child soldiers in five of the mandates relating to those conflicts. All of these mandates were post 2000. 
73United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General. 
 74United Nations Peacekeeping. Forming a new operation.  
75UNICEF. The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines.  
76Ibid.  
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supported in learning non-violent means of solving disputes and that ‘... an investment in young 
people will support the long term peace and security of the community, which may otherwise 
suffer problems if reintegration is not achieved’.77 Considering these possible challenges in the 
reintegration process, the UN is more likely to supply peacekeeping to such fragile post-conflict 
societies. 
Secondly, we suggest that the UN takes into account the low opportunity costs of former 
child soldiers joining or starting a new rebellion if they do not have adequate means of supporting 
themselves and/or their families. In a report about the conflict in South Sudan, the UN Secretary- 
General explicitly states that: 
... sufficient alternative livelihoods and education opportunities have not been available, thus in- 
creasing vulnerability and risks of recruitment. This has been particularly relevant in the case of 
children who were formerly associated with armed forces and groups, many of whom had not 
been provided with reintegration support such as education or livelihood opportunities. 
Investment in vocational training is needed and support for a reintegration package that addresses 
the individual needs of children is urgently required.78 
These economic grievances are a threat to security and stability internally and more likely 
to attract a UN response. In addition, the instability in a post-conflict country can often lead to 
conflict contagion to other countries through, for example, refugee flows. Hence, the 
international community must also factor in how an individual conflict may threaten international 
peace and security.79 
Economic grievances and aggression can cause child soldiers to destabilise a post-conflict 
society. Since post-conflict instability makes conflict more likely to recur, we argue that the UN 
deems such circumstances necessitating a PKO. Based on the aforementioned destabilising effects 
of child soldiers in the aftermath of the conflict, we hypothesize that the presence of child soldiers 
in a conflict makes the presence of UN peacekeeping operations in a post-conflict society more 
likely. In sum, the two arguments developed in this section reinforce each other. We should 
expect a positive effect on PKOs presence along with the use of child soldiers in the conflict. 
Although the arguments outlined here are distinct, we do not regard them as disparate 
mechanisms that require separate and explicit comparison, but rather as 
77Ibid. 
78United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General  
79Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the contagion of armed conflict”. 
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a set of related theoretical reasons for expecting an increasing PKO effect at the presence of child 
soldiers. 
 
 
5 Research Design 
 
5.1 Data and Variables 
 
The empirical analysis of this paper relies on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset on Non-
State Actors (version 3.3)80 and the Conflict Termination Dataset (version 2.0)81. The unit of 
analysis in our cross sectional dataset is post- conflict-dyad-societies. For instance, a government 
is combined with a rebel group in one period of time in which the attributes of this conflict dyad 
do not change. As soon as there is a change in the conflict dyad, a new period of time is activated 
and, thus, a new observation is generated in the data. The post-conflicts are operationalised as the 
first year after the end of a conflict between 1989 and 2005. Note that an armed conflict occurs 
when there is a dispute that involves at least one government actor and results in 25 battle-
related fatalities in a year. Our main modelling choice is a probit estimator, because we examine 
a binary dependent variable. We also test our hypothesis in a bivariate model setting to control for 
any potential selection effects in the presence of a PKO. 
Dependent Variable 
Traditionally the term peacekeeping refers to international personnel deployed to help 
maintain peace and security.82 This maintaining of peace and security definition varies in 
academic studies from preventing conflict recurrence83 to curbing and eliminating hostilities.84 
The existing literature on UN PKOs has also adapted to the changing nature of the PKOs in  
 
80Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “Non-state actors in civil wars”. 
81Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
82Fortna and Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature”. 
83Virginia Page Fortna. “ Does peacekeeping work?” 
84Greig and Diehl,  “The peacekeeping – peacemaking dilemma”. 
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practice by  incorporating both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions into their definitions.85 
In this study we focus on multidimensional peacekeeping.86 Even though we are interested 
in the presence of UN PKOs in the post-conflict societies, we know that many of the PKOs are in 
fact deployed while the conflict is still ongoing. This is indicative of the changes in the mandates 
of the UN PKOs from a narrow monitoring of ceasefires to more inclusive civilian and 
humanitarian elements. These peacebuilding elements can range from demobilisation, 
reintegration to building institutions and providing humanitarian assistance.87 We focus on the 
post-conflict phase for two reasons. First, UN interventions into active conflicts are usually 
peace-enforcement missions, which are theoretically distinct from peacekeeping missions we 
focus on.88 Second, an empirical focus on the period once a conflict is over allows us to circumvent 
one source of endogeneity to a large extent. Specifically, in anticipation of a UN intervention in 
an active conflict, rebel groups might increasingly recruit children, thus reversing the relationship 
we argue for. Exclusively analysing the post-conflict phase allows us to avoid the problems 
associated with this.89 
Our dependent variable captures the presence of a UN PKO in the post-conflict period and 
is time invariant. The information is taken from the online descriptions of UN peacekeeping 
operations. According to the UN definition of PKO deployment is: 
A peacekeeping operation is led by the department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) and 
works to create the conditions for lasting peace in a country torn by conflict. A peacekeeping 
operation consists of military, police and civilians personnel who work to deliver security, political 
and early peace building support.90 
We have adopted the measure for UN PKO from previous research by Rustad and 
Binningsbø91. Their data describe whether there was UN presence in the post-conflict period 
or not, resulting to a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for PKO presence in post-conflicts  
 
85Findlay, The use of force in UN peace operations”; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, “United Nations peacekeeping 
dynamics.”  
86Dorussen and  Gizelis,“Into the Lion’s Den”. 
87Fortna and Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature”. 
88Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
89When we include conflict years into our analysis and distinguishing between UN and non-UN involvement years, 
the results we present below remain largely unchanged: child soldiers increase the likelihood of UN peacekeeping 
involvement. 
90United Nations Peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations.  
91Rustad and Binningsbø. “A price worth fighting for?”. 
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(0 otherwise). 
Main Independent Variable 
We examine whether the use of child soldiers in conflicts affects the presence of a UN PKO in 
a post-conflict society. The core explanatory variable concerns the use of child soldiers by rebel 
groups. While rebel groups are not the only organizations that recruit child soldiers,92 we focus on 
these groups, since – as highlighted by Tynes and Early93– rebel groups have stronger incentives 
than governments to use child soldiers: the former have ‘fewer constraints’ and ‘more to gain’ 
than the latter.94 
The information on child soldiers comes from the recent dataset by Haer and Böhmelt95. Their 
child soldier measure is based on information provided by independent reports from, inter alia, 
Child Soldiers International, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Global March 
against Child Labour, and various independent news and academic sources.96 Haer and Böhmelt97 
discuss the differences between their data and other existing data sources on child soldiers.98 
For instance, Beber and Blattman99 code information about child soldiers, but focus only on 
rebel groups that operated in sub-Saharan Africa. Tynes and Early100 record a dichotomous 
indicator on child soldiers by several armed groups worldwide between 1987 and 2007. Haer 
and Böhmelt101 seem to offer the most comprehensive coverage of rebel groups worldwide 
since 1989. Therefore, we employ their measure of child soldiers, which is coded 1 in the presence 
of child soldiers recruited by rebels and 0 otherwise. 
Haer and Böhmelt102 also code an ordinal variable, but we rely on their binary variable in our 
 
92Tynes and Early. “Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers”. 
93Ibid. 
94Tynes and Early (ibid.) indicate that rebel groups employed child soldiers in 78.8% of the conflict dyads in their sample, 
while governments used them in only 60.1% of the cases. 
95Haer and Böhmelt, “The impact of child soldiers on rebel groups”. 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. 
98Ibid. (p. 8). 
99Beber and Blattman. “The logic of child soldiering and coercion”.  
100Tynes and Early, “Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers”.  
101Haer and Böhmelt, “The impact of child soldiers on rebel groups”. 
102Ibid. 
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analysis. The reason for this is given in Haer and Böhmelt103 (p. 8): 
 
The ordinal variable […]contains more information than the dichotomous item, employing this 
variable though makes averaging across conflict problematic […] Hence, by using the 
dichotomous child soldier variable, we discard information, but avoid the risk of making wrong 
assumptions about the actual size of child soldiering.104 
The aggregated dichotomous measurement for child soldiers is coded by calculating the mean 
value across conflict episodes. Child soldiering may vary across rebel groups and conflict 
episodes, it is however, held constant across conflict episodes after aggregation.105 The armed forces 
in this dataset refer to all the rebel groups identified in the Non-State Actor Dataset (NSA).106 
 
Control Variables 
Given that our analysis focuses on the determinants of a UN PKO, we control for other factors 
that classify a conflict as hard to resolve and more likely to experience a PKO.107 For the 
convenience of this analysis, we separate the control variables into two categories. The first set 
of covariates concerns the nature of the conflict. Previous studies have suggested that we usually 
see UN PKOs in natural resources conflicts. These conflicts are harder to solve because there 
are more opportunities to finance a rebellion. We include a variable, using data from Rustad 
and Binningsbø108, capturing whether a conflict was about natural resources or not. Along these 
lines, using data from Kreutz109, we also add a variable on the type of issue incompatibility, i.e., 
whether a conflict  
 
103Haer and Böhmelt, “The impact of child soldiers on rebel groups”. 
104Ibid. 
105Ibid. 
106Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan. “It Takes Two A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome”.; 
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “Non-state actors in civil wars”. 
107Gilligan and Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”. 
108Rustad and Binningsbø, “A price worth fighting for?”. 
109Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
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has been fought over government or territory. Conflicts over territory usually constitute the harder 
cases for the UN as they challenge the sovereignty of the disputants.110 Moreover, we consider a 
measure for battle-related deaths, which controls for the severity of a conflict. The data come 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.111 
The duration of a conflict is often linked with severity, given that the longer fighting goes on, 
the more casualties (including civilian) the conflict is likely to have. In addition, longer conflicts 
often become more complicated in terms of settlement efforts and therefore should be prioritised 
by the UN. Moreover, the entry time of a child soldier into a conflict and the conflict duration 
naturally influence the length of stay for child soldiers in conflicts. This can also influence the 
difficulty of reintegration efforts.112 We incorporate the natural logarithm of conflict duration in 
days in order to control for whether UN PKOs are more likely after longer conflicts. The start and 
end dates used for calculating conflict durations are based on the UCDP Conflict Termination 
data from Kreutz113. 
The way a conflict ends can influence the likelihood of a PKO presence and this is why 
we include two variables capturing the type of conflict termination. The first one is military 
victory, a binary variable coded as 1 for a military victory and 0 otherwise.114 Peacekeeping 
may be perceived less vital after a military victory due to the conflict having a decisive end, 
and a strong winning party that may be able to stabilise the post-conflict setting. The second 
type of termination we control for is peace agreements since they might influence the likelihood 
of peacekeeping. For instance, peacekeeping is less likely when a peace agreement has been 
reached.115 In our analysis, the peace agreement refers to either resolution or regulation 
(preliminary agreements) of the conflict116 that is different from formal agreements.  
The second category of determinants that classify the ‘hard cases’ for the UN includes several 
country-related covariates in order to test whether peacekeepers prefer to be present in countries 
110Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers, and Thyne, “Bones of Contention”.  
111Gleditsch, “Expanded trade and GDP data”.  
112Annan, Blattman, Mazurana, and Carlson, “Civil war, reintegration, and gender in Northern Uganda”. 
113Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”.  
114Ibid. 
115Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
116Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
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with specific characteristics. This assumption is linked with the interests of the intervening 
countries. These interests may be economic and ideological and therefore we include controls for 
such considerations. For measuring the regime type of a country, we use the modified polity 
indicator for democracy.117 The UN is more likely to be present in autocracies since the peace is 
less likely to last in politically non-inclusive regimes. Also, the international community might 
be motivated by democratization and thus, encourages peacekeeping in autocratic regimes. This 
variable ranges between -5 and +7 in our sample, where negative values approach a purely 
autocratic regime and positive values pertain to more democratic systems. Conflict in countries 
with low levels of economic development is also more challenging for reintegration efforts and 
should be more likely to attract a UN response. We capture economic development by GDP per 
capita (natural logarithm) to control for state capacity.118 
Additionally, we include infant mortality as an alternative indicator of economic development. 
Unlike other variables for development, infant mortality has a stronger focus on the ‘human 
element,’ i.e., it ‘captures the welfare levels of children within the country in which the 
conflict broke out’.119 The variable refers to infant mortality levels after the end of a conflict in 
order to capture the presence of a UN PKO after the end of a conflict and it describes mortality 
of children under five years old. The data for this variable come from UNICEF.120 Finally, we 
include a variable that measures ethnic fractionalization121 because ethnically heterogeneous 
countries are argued to be more conflict prone. High levels of ethnic fractionalization exasperate 
ethnic differences that make peaceful coexistence harder in post-conflict situations. 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables as well as 
117Vreeland,  “The effect of political regime 
118Gleditsch, “Expanded trade and GDP data”. 
119Tynes and Early, “Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers”. 
120UNICEF Statistics, Under five mortality rates.  
121Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war”. 
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the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of the explanatory variables. According to the VIFs, 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major issue, since all VIFs are below the common threshold 
value of 5. Variables with a value over 5 would indicate high multicollinearity.122  We also tested 
the correlation among our independent variables and include a table of the correlation matrix in 
the appendix (Table 1 in the appendix).  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Variation Inflation Factors 
 
 
 (Obs.) (Mean (Std. Dev.) (Min ) (Max) (VIF) 
UN PKO 91 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Child soldiers (recruited by rebels) 91 0.62 0.48 0 1 1.66 
Natural resource conflict 91 0.56 0.50 0 1 1.89 
Conflict duration 91 5.57 2.13 0 8.39 1.55 
Severity 86 232.55 418.54 25 2,721 1.28 
Victory 91 0.197 0.400 0 1 1.79 
Incompatibility 91 1.44 0.50 0 1 1.64 
Peace agreements 91 0.18 0.38 0 1 1.31 
Development 91 7.82 1.05 4.89 10.38 2.86 
Democracy 91 1.56 4.33 -5 7 1.43 
Infant mortality 90 65.87 36.74 5.8 153 2.88 
Ethnic fractionalization 90 0.57 0.23 0.04 0.90 2.10 
Child Soldiers (recruited by Governments) 91 0.41 0.49 0 1 1.63 
 
 
5.2 Empirical Analysis 
 
We include a baseline model (Table 2: Model 1) for two reasons; first, sometimes introducing 
control variables increases bias instead of diminishing it123 and second, our analysis has a small 
decrease of observations after adding more control variables in the subsequent models. Model 2 
incorporates all the control covariates discussed above and tests whether child soldiers increase 
the likelihood of peacekeeping. Model 3 introduces control variables that previous literature 
associates as important drivers of UN PKOs and concern the conflict as such.124 Therefore, in 
this model we exclude the country characteristic covariates. The standard errors are clustered at a 
country level in all models of the analysis. 
Probit regressions (Models 1, 2 and 3) show that the use of child soldiers in a conflict increases 
the probability of UN PKO presence in post-conflict societies. The relationship between child- 
soldiers usage and UN PKOs is statistically significant and positive. This result confirms our 
hypothesis that child soldiers influence UN PKOs deployment by making PKOs more likely in 
those cases with former child soldiers. When the UN sends a technical mission for the assessment 
of the conflict, they take into account the issue of child soldiers and consider that in order to secure 
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post-conflict stability, a PKO is required.  
 
 
122O’brien,“A caution regarding rules of thumb”.  
123Clarke, “The phantom menace”. 
124Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
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The probability for seeing a UN PKO after the end of a conflict increases by 3 percentage 
points, when child soldiers are employed in a conflict (the confidence interval ranging from 
0.001% to 19%). This is illustrated graphically in our first differences estimation, based on 
Model 2  (Figure 1). The first difference indicates the change in the probability of the dependent 
variable =1 (UN PKO =1) when changing a respective explanatory variable from its minimum to 
its maximum, while holding all other variables at their median values.125 The measure of child-
soldier usage is significant, since the confidence interval does not include zero. The horizontal bars 
pertain to 95% confidence intervals. The rest of the control covariates drive the likelihood of 
peacekeeping presence in post-conflicts similarly to results presented earlier in Table 2 (Model 
2). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Along with our expectations, the duration of a conflict increases the probability of a UN 
PKO. Conflict severity too, in accordance to prior research, positively predicts UN PKOs. Unlike 
Fortna126, we find support for the peace agreement variable in relation to a PKO. Fortna127 
suggests that the UN does not deem a PKO necessary when a peace agreement is signed. 
However, a regulation alone does not secure peace and peacekeepers may still consider it important 
to be present in such cases.128 
Although a military victory highly predicts the durability of peace129, in our model a military 
victory is not a significant predictor of the presence of a UN PKO in post conflicts. The UN also 
does not cherry pick on the issues of the conflict that they are more likely to intervene in, given 
that both covariates for types of conflicts, natural resource and incompatibility, are not 
statistically significant predictors.130  In addition, the country-related variables we included  
125King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, “Making the most of statistical analyses”. 
126Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
127Ibid. 
128Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
129Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
130Note that previous literature presents mixed results for these predictors, see Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”; 
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show that economic development of the recipient country does not significantly influence 
peacekeeping, however, more democratic regimes are significantly more likely to experience a 
UN PKO. Although Collier and Hoeffler131 found that ethnicity is an important indicator for civil 
war onsets, our results suggest that ethnic heterogeneity of the conflict country is not a significant 
contributor for the presence of a PKO in post-conflict periods. Infant mortality lacks statistical 
significance meaning that other covariates measuring either the development or the severity of the 
conflict might be more important determinants of a PKO. 
While the results of some of these predictors do not match the expectations expressed in 
earlier studies132, our findings do mirror other studies that make use of the same data structure 
(i.e., Kreutz133 and Haer and Böhmelt134). Kreutz135 (p. 247) explains the difference between his 
(and our) insignificant findings on the controls and significant results in earlier studies.136 First, 
Walter137 and Quinn, Mason, and Gurses138 employ data that focus only on conflicts with at least 
1,000 battle-deaths within a given year. The UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset follows the 25 
annual battle-related deaths threshold of the UCDP PRIO Dataset. Also, Walter139 and Quinn, 
Mason, and Gurses140 use a country-year format dataset, while the UCDP Conflict Termination 
Dataset is designed in a conflict-year format. Hence, it is possible to obtain several different 
conflicts in the same country at the same time. Finally, the datasets employed by Walter141 and 
Quinn, Mason, and Gurses142 (p. 182) have a less precise coding of the type of outcome than 
the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset. For instance, if a civil war fails to reach the 
 
Haer and Böhmelt, “The impact of child soldiers on rebel groups”; Rustad and Binningsbø, “A price worth fighting 
for?”. 
131Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war”. 
132Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the peace”. 
133Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
134Haer and Böhmelt, “Child soldiers as time bombs?”  
135Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
136Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the peace”. 
137Walter, “Does conflict beget conflict?” 
138Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the peace”. 
139Walter, “Does conflict beget conflict?”. 
140Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the peace”. 
141Walter, “Does conflict beget conflict?” 
142Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the peace”. 
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threshold of battle-deaths, it is considered terminated by either victory or negotiated settlement, 
without accounting for other outcomes. As described in depth by Kreutz143 (p. 247), our data 
seem more accurate than data used in previous studies. 
The traditional approach to examining explanatory variables in the context of UN peacekeeping 
operations, so far, has mainly been limited to the analysis of their statistical significance. 
Nevertheless, statistical significance alone often leads to modest improvements in our ability to 
predict the outcome of events such as UN PKO deployment. Therefore, Figure 1 (in the appendix) 
focuses on the predictive power of the full model (Model 2, Table 2). We do so by deleting one 
key explanatory variable from the full model at a time and then measuring the effect that the 
deletion has on the resulting model’s ability to make in-sample predictions, i.e., to correctly 
classify cases as onsets (or non-onsets) of UN PKOs. 144 145 
 
 
143Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end”. 
144Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke, “The perils of policy by p-value”. 
145The procedure for in-sample predictions is described in detail in Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (ibid.). 
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 Model 3 in our analysis also confirms that child soldiers should be one of the commonly used 
covariates in the literature that examines the presence of PKOs. Excluding the country-related 
factors (i.e., development, democracy), the results for child soldiers -among the other 
determinants- are robust, increasing the likelihood of peacekeeping. The last model in our 
analysis (Model 4) is a bivariate probit model, which addresses a potential source of endogeneity 
due to the likely non-random assignment of child soldiers. Third-party interventions are likely 
to be chosen with respect to their outcomes, e.g., cases that can easily be addressed146 – or 
perhaps the more difficult ones147 – may attract peacekeeping more than others. While this is 
precisely the process we seek to assess with our main models, the factors that affect peacekeeping 
could have also influenced the use of child soldiers during the conflict in the first place. Not 
controlling for this two-stage process may either over- or underestimate our findings. Based on 
the specifications outlined in Maddala148 and Greene149, we use a bivariate probit model that 
employs two separate equations with correlated disturbances (Model 4). For these estimations, 
we define two different dependent variables: one for the outcome equation and one for the 
selection equation. The dependent variable for the outcome equation is the presence of a PKO. 
The second equation relies on the presence of a PKO as the outcome variable,  which is then 
estimated at the same time as the first equation, while taking into consideration the correlation 
in the equations’ error processes.150  The dependent variable in the  
 
146Beardsley, “The UN at the peacemaking–peacebuilding nexus”.; Bercovitch and Gartner, “Is there method in the 
madness of mediation?  
147Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
148Maddala, Limited-dependent and qualitative variable.   
149Greene, Econometric analysis.  
150Greene, Econometric analysis; Maddala, Limited-dependent and qualitative variables. 
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selection equation is the use of child soldiers in the preceding conflict. A bivariate model 
specification relies on the exclusion of at least one variable from the selection equation, but also 
on the use of instrumental variables.151 We exclude the variables that are related to a post-
conflict period from the selection equation; peace agreement and victory. To put it differently, 
we only see a peace agreement and the type of victory at the aftermath of a conflict. In addition, 
we exclude the development and democracy variables, as they should not directly affect the 
recruitment of child soldiers by rebels (dependent variable in the selection equation). We then 
use a modified version of infant mortality (that we used above as a control for the probit model) 
as an instrumental variable in the selection equation. That is, we employ infant mortality at the 
beginning of the conflict. We use increased rates of infant morality as a proxy for fewer 
opportunities for rebel groups to recruit child soldiers. The rate of infant mortality at the 
beginning of the conflict is unlikely to be endogenous to a UN PKO after the end of it, since infant 
mortality generally increases during a conflict.152 Given that the two equations in our analysis 
refer to different units of analysis (outcome: post-conflict; selection: conflict), we employ the 
variable of infant mortality with the values at the beginning of a conflict for the selection equation. 
We also include a reduced form model to rule out a direct impact of the instrument on the dependent 
variable (Table 2 in the appendix).  
The rho (ρ) parameter is statistically insignificant, which emphasizes that it is unlikely that 
the model’s two equations are correlated and that our model is not affected by selection into child 
soldiering as one source of endogeneity bias. A statistically insignificant ρ indicates that common 
unmeasured factors do not affect the outcomes of the two equations. Since the results of the 
main independent variable and the control covariates are in line with the results of the probit 
models (Models 1-3), our claim that the existence of child soldiers in a conflict increases the 
likelihood of a PKO in a post-conflict society remains unchallenged. While there is probably more 
than one way to demonstrate that our estimate of this parameter is not affected by 
151Bercovitch and Gartner, “Is there method in the madness of mediation”. 
152Tynes and Early, “Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers”. 
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particularities of the model specification, we opted for an additional bivariate probit model (Table 
3 in the appendix). 
For additional robustness checks, we have also included a model illustrating regional fixed 
effects controlling for different propensity of PKO presence in different areas (Table 4 in the 
appendix). We also take into consideration the usage of child soldiers by governments. We 
provide a complementary model to our analysis that examines the likelihood of a PKO 
presence when governments recruit child soldiers using the data on child soldier recruitment 
by governments from Tynes and Early (Table 5 in the appendix). It is also likely that peace 
enforcement in the preceding conflict increases the likelihood of UN presence after the end of 
the conflict. For this reason, we have included a model in the appendix (Table 6 in the appendix) 
that takes into account the presence of UN peace-enforcement missions. 
In addition, the presence of child soldiers might influence the type of response the UN deploys 
to a conflict. Specifically, securing post-conflict stability in the long term often requires a more 
tailored civilian response element by the UN.153 We test such argument by looking at the number 
of troops, police or military observers that a UN mission employs in post-conflict periods in the 
presence of child soldiers, using data from Kathman154. The results in a baseline model highlight 
that the number of police (civilian element) deployed into a conflict is indeed significantly higher 
in the presence of child soldiers in comparison to troops and military observers. We would, 
however, exercise caution in interpreting these results as we only have data for 21 missions. Note 
that the information provided by Kathman155 covers UN PKO missions from 1990 to 2011, thus 
slightly different from the years covered in our main analysis. 
153Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, “United Nations peacekeeping”. 
154Kathman, “United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments”. 
155Ibid. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The existing academic literature on peacekeeping has primarily produced findings about the 
determinants of peacekeeping onset156 and effectiveness.157 Somewhat surprisingly, although a 
few recent studies have given important insights regarding child soldiering158, they have not 
connected the issue with UN peacekeeping. Empirical findings suggest that peacekeepers tend 
to be sent to the difficult cases that are problematic in terms of conflict resolution and durable 
peace.159 We argue that child soldiers create one of those hard cases and therefore we need to 
connect the issue of child soldiers to the presence of UN PKOs in post-conflicts. 
We tried to fill the gap in the existing literature by explaining why child soldiers increase the 
likelihood of peacekeeping missions by the UN. The empirical results based on post-conflict 
periods since 1989 confirm our theoretical expectation: child soldiers do influence the probability 
of a PKO presence in a post-conflict society. When rebel groups recruit children as soldiers, we 
are more likely to see a PKO in the post-conflict period. This finding is driven by the estimated 
risk of post-conflict instability by the UN. In the presence of child soldiers in a post-conflict 
society, such risk prompts the UN peacekeepers. A potential relapse of violence is a great concern 
for peacekeepers and for the international community as a whole. 
Our theoretical framework highlights two primary reasons why child soldiers exasperate the 
concern of post-conflict instability. Firstly, in accordance with recent survey results from Uganda, 
we argue that economic and educational grievances hamper the establishment of viable  
156Andersson, “Democracies and UN peacekeeping operations”; Bove, “A theoretical approach to the demand and supply 
for peacekeeping”; Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping”. 
157Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the contagion of armed conflict”; Hultman, “UN peace operations and protection of 
civilians”. 
158Gates, Child soldiers in the age of fractured states. Lasley and Thyne, “Secession, legitimacy and the use of child 
soldiers”. 
159Fortna, “Does peacekeeping keep peace?”. 
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livelihoods and therefore future alternatives to fighting for child soldiers.160 In addition, 
possible aggression by former child soldiers complicates the acceptance of these child soldiers 
into their native communities. Both of these mechanisms create unstable post-conflict conditions 
where the barriers for resuming violence are lower and peace might be threatened. For these 
aforementioned reasons, the UN is more likely to be present in the post-conflict societies with 
former child soldiers. Granted that our research only focuses on PKOs employed by the UN, 
we suggest that future academic research should examine the impact of child soldiers in missions 
employed by other institutions too (i.e., NATO or African Union led peacekeeping missions). 
Generally, academic research should incorporate the use of child soldiers into their theoretical 
and empirical models for more rigorous results. 
Child soldier usage might be a signal of changes in the micro dynamics of a conflict and this 
could be incorporated into the predictive models of conflict behaviour. Finally, in the context of 
post-conflict behaviour, more emphasis should be given on the mediation settlement attempts 
and their effectiveness when child soldiers are involved in a conflict. UN peacekeeping and 
mediation might both lead to peace but under different processes. Is the use of child soldiers a 
significant factor for mediators to intervene? These are only a few of the questions that could 
be addressed in relation to the study of child soldiering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160Blattman and Annan, “The consequences of child soldiering”. 
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Appendix 
 
For additional robustness checks, we present here a table of the correlation matrix of the 
independent variables employed in our analysis (Table 1). Generally, the results indicate that 
correlation among explanatory variables is not significantly high, excluding the indicators of 
development and infant mortality (-0.80***). We ultimately employ infant mortality as an 
additional predictor of development, to employ it at a later stage as an instrumental variable in 
the analysis. Nevertheless, excluding infant mortality from our model, the results hold the same. 
The ability to make predictions across the full range of possible thresholds can be inferred 
from the size of the area between the x-axis and the ROC curve, the area under the ROC curve 
(AUC), which ranges from a minimum of 0 (in the case of random guess) to a maximum of 1 (in 
the case of a perfect model with no false negatives and no false positives). Figure 1 demonstrates 
that our full model has a predictive power (in terms of the AUC) of 0.932. To see the marginal 
contribution that one of the key indicators, i.e., conflict duration, makes to the original model’s 
overall predictive power, we look at the difference between the area under the ROC curve 
calculated for the full model and the corresponding area calculated for a model that drops this item 
on the duration of a conflict. The model’s predictive power falls from 0.932 to 0.893 when doing 
so, thus demonstrating that the conflict-duration variable makes a contribution of roughly 0.039 
units to the overall predictive power of the model. We repeat this approach by putting the 
duration variable back into the model, but excluding the severity of the conflict that is also a 
significant determinant of UN PKOs. The exclusion of this variable decreases the predictive 
power by only 
0.007 units. Also, we exclude the peace-agreements variable, which has an individual predictive 
power of 0.040 units. When omitting the democracy covariate, the predictive power decreases by 
0.016 units. Finally, when we exclude our indicator of child soldiers, the predictive power of the 
model falls from 0.932 to 0.917, which mirrors the predictive power of the other key explanatory 
variables. This shows that, among other explanatory variables from the previous literature, the 
child-soldiers variable has a substantive predictive power in relation to the UN PKO deployment- 
and not only statistical significance. 
Table 2 illustrates a reduced form model that aims to rule out a direct impact of the 
instrument (infant mortality at the beginning of the conflict) on the dependent variable (UN PKO). 
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That is, we replace the endogenous variable (child soldiers) with the instrumental variable (infant 
mortality at the beginning of the conflict) and examine whether the latter is significant to the UN 
PKO variable. The results mirror a non-significant relationship between infant mortality at the 
beginning of the conflict and a UN PKO. Therefore, we can claim that infant mortality at the 
beginning of the conflict is and exogenous indicator of the outcome variable. 
In Table 3 we opted for an additional bivariate probit model that excludes country-related 
variables (Democracy and Development) from the outcome equation. Nevertheless, the results 
are virtually identical to the bivariate probit model presented in the main article. 
We have also included a model illustrating regional fixed effects controlling for different 
propensity of PKO presence in different areas. We added four regional dummy variables; Middle 
East, Africa, Asia and Europe. The baseline of this model is America and the results of all the 
variables are consistent with the models in the main analysis (Table 4). 
Furthermore, we take into consideration the usage of child soldiers by governments. Thus, we 
provide a complementary model to our analysis that examines the likelihood of a PKO presence 
when governments recruit child soldiers using the data on child soldier recruitment by 
governments from Tynes and Early (Table 5). The results indicate that the use of child soldiers 
by governments also prompt the presence of UN PKOs after the end of a conflict. That is, the 
likelihood of a UN response increases as long as there are child soldiers – regardless from the 
actor employing them. The overall results are similar to those of our main analysis examining the 
use of child soldiers by rebels. An overview of the governments and rebel groups’ child soldier 
usage is already given in Tynes and Early1 (p. 82) and Haer and Böhmelt2 (p. 4). 
It is also likely that peace enforcement in the preceding conflict increases the likelihood of 
UN presence after the end of the conflict. For this reason, we have included a model (Table 6) that 
takes into account the presence of UN peace-enforcement missions. The data for peace 
enforcement are taken from Fortna3, who codes enforcement as any substantial military force 
mandated to use force for purposes other than self-defense.’ Table 6, which includes this binary 
variable for peace enforcement by the UN, next to our other controls, shows that peace 
enforcement is unlikely to be related significantly to (post-conflict) peacekeeping operations. That 
being said, in this hard test, the significance of our key independent variable (child soldiers) is 
unaltered. 
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients of the covariates 
 
Child Soldiers (recruited by rebels) Natural resource conflict Conflict duration Severity Victory Incompatibility Peace agreements Development Democracy Ethnic fractionalization Infant mortality
Child Soldiers (recruited by rebels) 1.0 
Natural resource conflict 0.23** 1.0
(0.02)
Conflict duration 0.34*** 0.23 1.0
(0.01) (0.02)
Severity 0.09 0.08 0.15 1.0
(0.38) (0.44) (0.16)
Victory -0.30** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.08 1.0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.43)
Incompatibility -0.01 -0.42*** 0.01 -0.08 0.34*** 1.0 
(0.98) (0.01) (0.85) (0.41) (0.01)
Peace agreements 0.11 0.17* 0.07 0.23* -0.22** 0.05 1 .0
(0.26) (0.09) (0.45) (0.02) (0.02) (0.59) 
Development -0.01 -0.29*** -0.31*** 0.01 0.21** -0.04 -0.16 1.0
(0.94) (0.01) (0.00) (0.90) (0.04) (0.64) (0.12)
Democracy -0.17* -0.18* -0.21** -0.05 0.12 -0.13 0.16 0.15 1.0
(0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.61) (0.25) (0.21) (0.12) (0.14)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.23** 0.36*** 0.27** -0.18* -0.38*** -0.23** 0.21** -0.50*** 0.08 1.0
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.43)
Infant mortality 0.06 0.33*** 0.29** -0.07 -0.19* 0.02 0.11 -0.80*** -0.19* 0.53*** 1.0
(0.53) (0.01) (0.01) (0.50) (0.06) (0.81) (0.30) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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  ( Model 1) 
Probit regression model 
Infant mortality (beginning of conflict) -0.00
  (0.01)
Natural resource conflict -0.38 
  (0.57)
Conflict duration 0.49** 
  (0.23)
Severity 0.00** 
  (0.00)
Victory -0.49 
  (0.72)
Incompatibility 0.87* 
  (0.48)
Peace agreements 1.68** 
  (0.72)
Development -0.26 
  (0.33)
Democracy 0.11** 
  (0.05)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.77 
  (0.85)
_Constant -2.57 
  (3.71)
N 82
pseudo R2 0.47 
Wald Chi2 15.90*
 
 
Table 2: UN PKO and Infant Mortality (beginning of conflict): Reduced form model 
 
       
  
   
       
  
   
       
  
   
       
  
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1: In-sample predictions: ROC curves 
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Table 3: UN PKO and Child Soldiers (Bivariate probit: Robustness test) 
 
  (Model 1)  
Bivariate probit regression model 
Outcome equation 
Child soldiers (recruited by rebels) 1.75** 
(0.72) 
Natural resource conflict -0.58 
  (0.62)
Conflict duration 0.33 
  (0.30)
Severity 0.01 
  (0.01)
Victory 0.02 
  (0.55)
Incompatibility 0.21 
  (0.41)
Peace agreements 1.61* 
(0.97) 
Ethnic fractionalization -1.13 
  (0.96)
Constant -3.96* 
(2.05) 
Selection equation 
Child soldiers (recruited by rebels)  
Conflict duration 0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Severity 0.01 
  (0.01)
Incompatibility 0.06 
  (0.35)
Ethnic fractionalization 1.73** 
(0.87) 
Infant mortality (beginning of conflict) -0.01 
  (0.01)
Constant -1.47*** 
(0.51) 
ρ -0.66
(0.56)
N 82
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: UN PKO and Child Soldiers (Regional fixed effects) 
  
Probit regression model 
 
Child soldiers 1.57** 
(0.56) 
 
Natural resource conflict  -0.22 
(0.58) 
 
Conflict duration 0.39** 
(0.20) 
Severity  0.01 
(0.00) 
 
Victory -0.23 
(0.86) 
 
Incompatibility 0.36 
(0.40) 
 
Peace agreements 1.64** 
(0.73) 
 
Development -0.01 
(0.34) 
 
Democracy 0.21** 
(0.07) 
 
Infant mortality 0.01 
(0.01) 
 
Ethnic fractionalization -1.45* 
(0.82) 
 
Middle East 5.50*** 
(0.88) 
 
Africa 4.62*** 
(1.22) 
 
Asia 3.28** 
(1.30) 
 
Europe 4.52*** 
(0.77) 
 
Constant -9.66** 
(4.08) 
N 84 
pseudo R2 0.54 
Wald Chi2 431.00*** 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: UN PKO and Child Soldiers (Recruited by Governments) 
 
 
 
(Model 1) 
Probit regression model 
Child soldiers (recruited by Governments) 2.01***
 (0.70)
Natural resource conflict -1.43 
 (0.95)
Conflict duration 0.83** 
 (0.35)
Severity 0.01 
 (0.00)
Victory -0.78 
 (0.94)
Incompatibility 0.64 
 (0.60)
Peace agreements 2.27** 
 (0.92)
Infant mortality -0.10 
 (0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization -1.87 
 (0.97)
Constant -1.18 
 (4.91)
N 82
pseudo R2 0.56 
Wald Chi2 28.19***
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: UN PKO and Child Soldiers (Controlling for UN peace enforcement) 
 
 
Probit regression 
model
Child soldiers (recruited by 0.81**
 (0.38)
Natural resource conflict -0.62
 (0.54)
Conflict duration 0.53**
 (0.23)
Severity 0.01**
 (0.01)
Victory -0.28
 (0.76)
Incompatibility 0.55
 (0.44)
Peace agreements 1.87**
 (0.68)
Infant mortality 0.01
 (0.01)
Development 0.03
 (0.34)
Democracy 0.12**
 (0.06)
Ethnic fractionalization -1.31*
 (0.80)
UN peace enforcement -0.22
 (0.75)
Constant -5.86
 (4.45)
N 84
pseudo R2 0.49
Wald Chi2 22.37*
*Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Notes 
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Management and Peace Science (2015). 
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Press, 2008. 
   
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Variation Inflation Factors 
  
  (Obs.) (Mean (Std. Dev.) (Min ) (Max) (VIF) 
UN PKO 91 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Child soldiers (recruited by rebels) 91 0.62 0.48 0 1 1.66 
Natural resource conflict 91 0.56 0.50 0 1 1.89 
Conflict duration 91 5.57 2.13 0 8.39 1.55 
Severity 86 232.55 418.54 25 2,721 1.28 
Victory 91 0.197 0.400 0 1 1.79 
Incompatibility 91 1.44 0.50 0 1 1.64 
Peace agreements 91 0.18 0.38 0 1 1.31 
Development 91 7.82 1.05 4.89 10.38 2.86 
Democracy 91 1.56 4.33 -5 7 1.43 
Infant mortality 90 65.87 36.74 5.8 153 2.88 
Ethnic fractionalization 90 0.57 0.23 0.04 0.90 2.10 
Child Soldiers (recruited by Governments) 91 0.41 0.49 0 1 1.63 
 
  
Table 2: UN PKO and Child Soldiers 
  
  (Model 1) 
Probit regression model 
(Model 2) 
Probit regression model 
(Model 3) 
Probit regression model 
(Model 4) 
Bivariate probit regression model 
Outcome equation    
Child soldiers (recruited by rebels) 0.76* 0.81** 0.74* 1.81** 
  (0.39) (0.38) (0.43) (0.83) 
Natural resource conflict   -0.59 -0.82 -0.54 
    (0.57) (0.51) (0.63) 
Conflict duration   0.50** 0.51** 0.33 
    (0.23) (0.23) (0.39) 
Severity   0.01* 0.01** 0.01 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Victory   -0.27 0.41 -0.31 
    (0.74) (0.59) (0.64) 
Incompatibility   0.53 0.30 0.37 
    (0.43) (0.42) (0.57) 
Peace agreements   1.79** 1.85*** 1.46 
    (0.74) (0.63) (1.01) 
Infant mortality   0.01  
    (0.00)  
Development   0.06 -0.23 
    (0.33) (0.24) 
Democracy   0.11** 0.08 
    (0.05) (0.05) 
Ethnic fractionalization   -1.30 -1.72** 
    (0.80) (0.85) 
Constant -1.56*** -5.98 -5.41*** -2.09 
  (0.34) (4.31) (1.60) (3.88) 
 
Selection equation        
Child soldiers (recruited by rebels)        
 
Conflict duration         0.20*** 
    (0.07) 
Severity   0.01 
    (0.00) 
Incompatibility   0.04 
    (0.35) 
Infant mortality (beginning of conflict)   -0.01 
    (0.00) 
Ethnic  fractionalization   1.75** 
    (0.89) 
Constant   -1.46*** 
(0.50) 
 
ρ         -0.71 
(0.57) 
N 91 84 86 82 
pseudo R2 0.05 0.49 0.46 
Wald Chi2 3.42* 20.64* 21.98***  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01    
Note: Models 2 and 4 have fewer observations due to perfect prediction caused by some additional explanatory 
variables. 
